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N.H. WILSON: POPULISM IN RHODESIAN POLITICS* 
H.I, WETHERELL 
University of Rhodesia
THERE HAS NEVER been a populist International nor an exchange of 
views between different populist leaders on the meaning or significance 
of their respective struggles. There is consequently a degree of isolated 
spontaneity peculiar to populist parties which makes it difficult to 
place the Southern Rhodesian populist movement in an international 
perspective. This article therefore restricts itself to a discussion of Rho­
desian populism with particular regard to the views of N.H. Wilson, 
who tried to propagate a populist philosophy and programme suited to 
the circumstances of Southern Rhodesia.
It is undoubtedly easier to define precisely what populists oppo­
sed than what they favoured. In nineteenth century Russia, narodniks 
sought a return to the uncomplicated and idyllic rural community, 
self-sufficient and uncorrupted by urbanization. In that they resented 
encroachment by centralized authority and the institutions of indust­
rialized society, they differed little from their North American counter­
parts. Nineteenth century populism in the United States was founded 
largely on the resentment of a rural society which, not having been 
industrialized itself, was very much the victim of the trusts and mono­
polies that industrialization bred. The control o f credit and the pur­
chasing of produce rested largely with interests which the small farmers 
of the Midwest felt to be no longer representative of the American 
ideal. The traumatic transition from a nation of citizen-farmers to a 
nation of combines and corporations to which farmers were subordin­
ated inspired the creation of Peoples’ Parties designed to resurrect 
what was represented as the Ideal of the Founding Fathers.
Fundamentally this ideal took as its premise the notion that men 
on the land alone reflected that spirit of altruistic endeavour that kept 
governmental policy on the path of enlightened national self-interest. 
Farmers fed the nation and sought, not profit, but communal self- 
sufficiency in so doing. The State’s duty was the preservation of this 
system and the protection of its protagonists. Now alien influences 
based on the East Coast sought to extend their influence into the 
heart of the nation by directing the banks that controlled credit, com­
bining the land to increase profits, which in turn generated further
*This article is based on a paper delivered at the Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies, University of London, 29 Jan. 1976.
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capital development in the East. Whilst opposition was farmer-based, 
it did of course include those interests that were farmer-dependent, 
small shopkeepers and urban communities that served the land. To­
gether they constituted a non-industrial bourgeoisie that placed its 
faith in community co-operation, whose members knew their individ­
ual worth, and in similar vein, distrusted paper money and the process 
of demonetization.!
In the difficult post-war years of the 1920s the government of the 
Colony of Southern Rhodesia rested with individuals whose primary 
interest was the development of a mining industry that until 1923 had 
been the responsibility of the British South Africa Company. Respon­
sible Government had obliged this Company to share power and in­
fluence with a cabinet of settlers and a handful of representative insti­
tutions. Opposition to this governmental system emanated from organ­
ized labour on the one hand and various self-appointed guardians of 
‘the people’ on the other. The people in this case were the rural bour­
geoisie consisting of small-time farming interests, usually credit- 
dependent, and allied interests such as agrarian suppliers and small 
commercial interests. This alliance had been largely responsible for the 
attainment of self-government in 1923. It had also been consistently 
opposed to the Chartered Company’s monopoly of land and power and 
after 1924 observed with increasing unease the developing affinity 
between Sir Charles Coghlan’s Rhodesian Party government and the 
former ruling interest.
Some of the Rhodesian Party’s backbenchers were also concerned 
that what had been the party of the people, the Responsible Govern­
ment Party, was now in effect a party of the Establishment or vested 
interest. The Budget Debate has traditionally provided a forum where 
disgruntled Members are permitted a certain licence to speak on any 
topic at length, and the Budget Debate of May 1927 brought to a head 
the divergence of outlook within the party. Already in 1925 one mem­
ber, R.D. Gilchrist, had crossed the floor to sit with the four Indepen- 1
1 For further information on this topic, see R. Hofstadter, ‘North America’, 
in G. lonescu and E. Gellner (eds), Populism: Its National Characteristics (London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 9-27. The movement was finally extinguished by 
Roosevelt’s New Deal; but something of the spirit of populism is still embodied in 
the Social Credit Party of mid- and western Canada. Urbanized labour, it should be 
noted, steadfastly resisted the overtures of rural populists, quite understandably re­
fusing to subsidize the rural sector at the expense of urban living standards. In 
South Africa, the pact of 1924 between Hertzog’s populist National Party and 
Rand Labour represented a convenient electoral arrangement rather than ideolog­
ical affinity.
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dent members of the Opposition.2 Now F.L. Hadfield (Bulawayo 
Central) announced his resignation from the Rhodesian Party and 
claimed that two or three others would follow. He was referring to 
Max Danziger (Gwelo), Captain H. Bertin (Salisbury South), and F.P. 
Mennell (Bulawayo District).2 3
Danziger duly followed suit and gave as his reason the need for 
increased expenditure on land settlement and his opposition to Con­
cessions.4 Bertin accused the Government of not having a programme, 
and Mennell in a letter to the press said that the dissentients ‘never 
gave an undertaking to blindly follow a particular set of leaders with­
out reference to the programme which they were elected to carry out’.5 
Mennell, Bertin and Hadfield then joined with the now six Indepen­
dents (Montagu, Fletcher, Martin, Gilfillan, Gilchrist and Colonel 
Frank Johnson) to form a Progressive Party whose principles included 
opposition to monopolies and concessions, a vigorous immigration 
policy, the development of Matabeleland, a close scrutiny of the Rail­
ways Act which had left the railways in the hands o f the British South 
Africa Company, and an emphasis upon the need to develop African 
Reserves. Other points related to the need for a West Coast port, 
development of a Greater Rhodesia and depoliticization of a Civil 
Service still dominated by ex-Company men.6
The Chairman of the Progressive Party, Neil Housman Wilson, 
came to Southern Rhodesia in 1906 at the age of 20 to join the Brit­
ish South Africa Police. In 1910 he joined the Native Department 
where he remained until 1923 when an irregularity concerning finance 
at Mount Darwin where he was stationed obliged him to transfer to 
the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture.7 He resigned from the Public 
Service in 1924 to take up farming and was one of the first to believe 
that cotton could be grown in the lowveld. When farming failed, his 
interests turned to journalism and politics.
2 The four Independent members were, Sir Ernest Montagu (Hartley), R.A. 
Fletcher (Western), J.L. Martin (Eastern), and G.E. Gilfillan (Eastern). Although 
Montagu had been a prominent Company official and' all four had been associated 
with Unionist sentiment in 1922, Independents at the time of the first Assembly 
should be seen as representative, not of the former ruling interest, but of small busi­
ness and mining concerns and the none too wealthy farmer who felt excluded from 
the new political system.
3 [Southern Rhodesia] Debates [of the Legislative Assembly] (Salisbury, 
Parliamentary Printers, 1927), 6 ,17 May 1927, 441.
4 Ibid., 19 May 1927, 605.
5 [The]Bul[awayo ]Chron[icle ], 14 June 1927.
I 6 Ibid., 16 June 1927; for further information on the Progressive Party, •ee P[ublic] R[ecord] 0[ffice] , Dfominions] Offfice] , 63 [Southern Rhodesia, Original Correspondence 1926-9], 3/1302, 4465, 7979 and 10465: D.O. 63/5/4754; and H.I. Wetherell, ‘Continuity and Change in Opposition Politics in Southern Rhodesia 1923-62’ (Univ. of Rhodesia, unpubl. M.Phil. thesis, 1974).
7 S235/365 (Chief Native Commissioner, Correspondence: Darwin District, 
[1923 Audit Inspection Report).
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While working in the Native Department he had been elected Gen­
eral Secretary of the Public Services Association and it was in this 
capacity that he had served as an Advisory Member of the Southern 
Rhodesian delegation at the Terms of Union Convention at Cape Town 
in 1922. In the following year he had founded the Native Affairs De­
partment Annual, NADA.& Thus his interest in politics was an early 
development; as a trooper in the B.S.A.P. he had written several letters 
to British Members of Parliament advocating extensive white settlement 
in Central Africa.3 *9 It was this concern and his alarm at the inactivity of 
the Rhodesian Party government that led him to publish, while still 
farming at Zaka in 1926, a manifesto for a Progressive Responsible 
Government Party.10
Announcing that ‘the spirit of Responsible Government did not 
die with the referendum nor is it today represented in the Rhodesian 
Party’, Wilson asserted that the Progressive Responsible Government 
Party would rest on the support of the people and would stand for a 
consistent body of political doctrine. His party would seek control of 
the railways, increased land settlement, provision for native develop­
ment and the construction of a deep water port.11 With these views it 
is hardly surprising that Wilson should seek common cause with the 
dissident Members of the Legislative Assembly in 1927, and the result 
was the foundation of the Progressive Party later that year. In the 1928 
General Election the Progressives secured the return of only four mem­
bers to the Legislative Assembly, but they enjoyed the support of 30 
per cent of the electorate and won a substantial proportion of the votes 
in Mashonaland.12 The Country Party, founded in 1927 as the political 
arm of dissident farmers in the Rhodesia Agricultural Union and design­
ed to represent farming interests more directly in the Assembly, also 
contested the 1928 election considering itself the true repository of the 
settler spirit in much the same way as Progressives did; but its showing 
had been disappointing and Wilson now perceived that only if the popu­
lar parties, including Labour, united in a common front could any sub­
stantial measure of electoral success be achieved. He therefore agreed 
to continue as Chairman of the Progressive Party if given a mandate to 
negotiate fusion with the Country Party.13 This he was able to do 
once the Progressive Party had been converted to the need for market­
ing controls which formed the main plank in the Country Party’s 
platform and of its parent body, the Rhodesia Agricultural Union.
3 NAD A (1961), 38,104, obituary.
9 Interview with Mr L.K.S. Wilson, 20 July 1974.
10 N.H. Wilson, Progressive Responsible Government Party: Statement o f
Aims (Zaka, privately, mitneo, 1926).
11 Ibid.
12 F.M.G. Willson (ed.), Parliamentary Elections [and Referenda in Southern
Rhodesia ] (Salisbury, Univ. Coll, of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1963), 123.
13 The Spokesman, 27 Oct. 1929.
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The other major issue, the British South Africa Company’s continued 
retention of the Colony’s mineral rights, was one on which the popular 
parties were fully in agreement.14
At the Progressive Party’s Congress in July 1929, Wilson formally 
proposed the merger of the Progressives, the Country Party, and 
Labour — ‘the peoples’ parties’, as he described them. Speaking to his 
motion, the party chairman said that the difference between opposi­
tion and government was growing clearer each day. The opposition 
wanted the country developed ‘by and for the people of the Colony’ 
whereas government believed that the Colony could best be developed 
by encouraging large corporations, especially the B.S.A. Company. 
‘The Rhodesian Party was the only party in the country with its head­
quarters in London,’ Wilson declared.15
The Rhodesia Herald described Wilson’s speech as ‘a touch of 
arrogance’. ‘Why they should any more be peoples’ parties than the 
Rhodesian Party which has twice gained a majority of the peoples’ 
votes is a little difficult to see,’ one editorial remarked; but the Argus 
Press was deliberately missing the ideological point.16
By October 1929 negotiations had removed the final stumbling- 
block to fusion — the acceptance of marketing controls by the urban- 
based Progressives — and the new grouping, the Reform Party, emerged. 
At its inaugural congress, Wilson, now Reform Chairman, emphasized 
that a ‘natural cleavage’ had developed between opposition and gov­
ernment that cut across the previous Responsible Government- 
Unionist division. However, he forecast that it would probably be some 
time before the electorate threw off their affiliations of the past.17 
In fact, with a brief interlude in 1933, it was to be thirty-three years.
The Reform Party sought to improve Southern Rhodesia’s con­
stitutional position, determine ownership of the mineral rights, nation­
alize transportation, assist primary producers, work towards the 
creation of a Greater Rhodesia, and introduce legislation for efficient 
marketing (i.e. statutory controls). It was clear that Labour was deter­
mined to maintain its own identity and Reform’s acceptance of the 
need for marketing controls had only confirmed this position. If Wilson 
thought that events would now move inexorably forward to a popular 
government by 1933, he was greatly mistaken. The fragile alliance with
14 The Country Party also concurred with the Progressive Party’s advocacy of 
a ‘White Rhodesia’. This became a major tenet in populist thinking and was reflect­
ed in demands that Whites should displace Africans as postmen, telegraph messen­
gers, drivers and road gang supervisors. A necessary corollary to the implemen­
tation of such' a policy would have been the removal of the reserved clauses from 
the 1923 Constitution and this demand became increasingly significant, see [The] 
Rh[odesia]Her[ald], 12 July 1929.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 The Spokesman, 27 Oct. 1929.
58 POPULISM IN RHODESIAN POLITICS
the agrarian Country Party proved tenuous. Its leaders had been reluct­
ant to alienate the new Minister of Agriculture, R.A. Fletcher, a former 
Progressive who now sought to establish closer links with the Rhodesia 
Agricultural Union. Many ex-Country Party members deserted the 
Reform Party to work independently through the R.A.U. so that when 
the party held its annual congress in April 1930 it consisted mainly of 
ex-Progressives. Colonel Johnson, the only man of stature in the party 
and a unifying factor, was away in England; and Wilson refused to post­
pone the congress, fearing that Johnson would capture the presidency 
if he returned. J.A. Edmonds and W.A. Moubray, last of the ex- 
Country Party leaders, resigned in protest and Wilson was duly elected 
President.^8 Captain Bertin, Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative 
Assembly, put in a perennial bid for the presidency but Wilson was 
firmly in control of the delegates. Yet, his election, if anything, only 
served to widen the rift within the new party. The Bulawayo Chronicle 
described the congress as ‘a screaming farce’ and pointed out that prin­
ciples were being sacrificed for personality.19 Important individuals 
refused to accept office and Wilson himself withdrew increasingly from 
the party’s affairs, preferring instead to concentrate on his newspaper, 
The Spokesman, which he founded in 1928, and the White Rhodesia 
Association of which he was a founder member and Secretary.
The White Rhodesia Association has been formed as a non­
partisan body and the Secretaries of the Rhodesian Party, the Country 
Party, the Progressive Party and the Labour Party had all been members 
of the founding committee set up in January 1929 under the Chairman­
ship of Dr G.M. Huggins, M.L.A.20 The Association sought to establish 
in Southern Rhodesia a large white population with the aim of making 
the Colony a white man’s country in which all classes and grades of 
European could find an occupational niche. This would involve, of 
course, a substantial measure of segregation. Speaking to a meeting of 
the Association in June 1929, Wilson explained how the process of 
segregation would work and his plan later became known as the ‘Twin 
Pyramid’ policy. He likened the economic structure of the Colony to 
a stepped pyramid of which the three lower and larger steps were occu­
pied by Africans — unskilled, semi-skilled and in fewer cases, skilled. 
The upper steps of progressively smaller size were occupied by members 
of the ‘overlord class’ according to their ability. The African was stead­
ily ascending the pyramid forcing the white man upwards to a higher 
step where more ability was needed. Wilson observed that even in the 
best races there were men who could not do skilled work and there was 
no place for them at the top. They could not compete with Africans 
so they dropped out to become ‘Poor Whites’. The country, then, was 18920
18 Bui. Chron., 25 Apr. 1930.
19 Ibid.
20 The Spokesman, 31 Jan. 1929.
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faced with two alternatives: it could let things go on the way they were 
in which case Rhodesia would become ‘a black man’s country’, or 
alternatively it could make Rhodesia ‘a white man’s country’ by imple­
mentation of the ‘Twin Pyramid’ policy. ‘In the new order,’ said Wilson, 
•there would be two pyramids, one black and one white, a Colony so 
ordered that every type, class and grade would find a place in the econ­
omy of society which he could fill.’21 In Wilson’s ideal society, the 
Blacks would be confined to the tribal areas where they could manage 
their own affairs and rise to positions of authority, while in the white 
areas a greatly increased European population would consist of the 
primary producers providing the necessities of life and the remainder, 
the services and amenities. The white area would be divided into zones 
and over the years certain occupations in a given zone would be closed 
to Africans gradually forcing them back into the Reserves.
If Wilson was regarded as the main spokesman for the White Rhod­
esia Association in the country at large, it was left to Huggins, the 
Junior Member for Salisbury North, to voice the Association’s views 
in the Assembly; in April 1931 he proposed that the Government 
should institute ‘a gradual process of economic and political segre­
gation on a territorial basis’.22 Citing examples of the failure of 
racial integration, Huggins also opposed the principle that the African 
should remain servile to the European. He suggested that Native Coun­
cils be set up in the Reserves in exchange for the elimination o f Afri­
cans from the voters roll. H.U. Moffat replied effectively enough, point­
ing out that ‘so long as the native is of service to the Europeans, it is 
hopeless to expect the European to take a high ethical stand’;23 but it 
was Huggins whose reputation enjoyed a boost Whereas the Establish­
ment considered Danziger’s suggestion that Africans be shunted whole­
sale into Bechuanaland, as a little eccentric, and Wilson’s views as rather 
radical, there could be no questioning Huggins’s respectability. He 
represented the country’s most prestigious constituency which gave 
him its full support when, later in 1931, he resigned from the Rhod­
esian Party over the question of economies necessitated by the Depre­
ssion. Salisbury North contained the Colony’s largest concentration of 
Civil Servants and Huggins saw little reason why their salaries should 
be reduced because of governmental incompetence. His constituents 
naturally concurred.24 *
24 Rh. Her., 7 June 1929.
22 Debates, 10, 8 Apr. 1931, 368.
23 Ibid., 6 May 1931,1678.
24 Rh. Her., 3 Mar. 1932.
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It was therefore understandable that Huggins should attract the 
attention of the Reform Party at a time when its fortunes were begin­
ning to recover.25 The effect of two years of Depression had provided 
them with a useful weapon with which to belabour Moffat’s adminis­
tration.
Huggins was elected President of the Reform Party at its annual 
congress in July 1932, although he did not himself attend. In a process 
of elimination he defeated the incumbent, J.W. Watkinson, the hapless 
Bertin, Gilchrist, Captain F. Smith, the party chairman, Sir Hugh 
Williams and J.H. Smit who later withdrew in favour of Huggins. 
Although much of the time of the Congress was occupied by consider­
ation of the Amalgamation question on which opinion was divided, it 
was clear that ‘grass roots’ opinion favoured more immediate and 
‘popular’ considerations. Branch motions submitted included demands 
for the removal of Africans from the voters roll, implementation of 
Wilson’s segregation plans, a testing of the mineral rights ownership, 
replacement of Africans by Europeans in a whole range of occupations, 
assistance to small-workers in mining, an end to monopolies, legis­
lation to deal with miscegenation, a ‘forward’ immigration policy, and 
assistance schemes for increased settlement on the land.26 Watkinson 
declared that ‘the one abiding principle of the Reform Party [was] 
the development of Rhodesia as a true Colony, as the home of the 
white man, and against its exploitation primarily as dividend-earning 
for the benefit of the B.S.A. Company’.27
The Argus Press, now visibly intimidated by Reform’s current 
popularity, proclaimed in an editorial that the economy was recover­
ing and that the Colony’s affairs had been well managed under the 
Rhodesian Party: ‘Caution instead of ambitious projects has been a 
wise policy and the successors to the present Government will benefit 
from it.’28 It was nevertheless widely believed that Reform could not 
lose. An attractive platform of increased segregation, protection for 
white artisans in the form of Industrial Conciliation legislation, relief 
of unemployment, and ‘a comprehensive and constructive body of 
economic, constitutional and social reform’ had a profound impact on 
a society where one out of every seven Europeans had been unemploy­
ed, many losing their jobs to Africans, and where economic privation 
was widespread. Huggins provided the credible and respectable leader­
ship that the party so desperately needed, Wilson and Hadfield the
26 The party had also enjoyed its first electoral success when J.H. Smit, the 
late Mayor of Salisbury, was returned for Salisbury South at a March 1931 by- 
election, see Willson, Parliamentary Elections, 129.
26 Reform Party, ‘Agenda for the Annual Congress . . . Gwelo on July 25th 
and 26th 1932’.
27 Rh. Her., 26 July 1932.
28 Ibid., 28 July 1932.
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ideology that presented a dynamic and coherent appeal and the organ­
ization that ensured that electoral potential was adequately tapped. 
As long as the Colony’s economy had slowly and steadily expanded, 
Moffat’s uninspiring leadership and laissez-faire policy had satisfied 
the electorate; the crisis of the Depression, however, had crystallized 
racial insecurity and inspired demands for widespread industrial pro­
tection of a kind that the Rhodesian Party’s backers would have 
found dubious. A last minute bid by the Government in 1933 to 
purchase the mineral rights and introduce marketing controls came 
too late to save the party’s flagging fortunes.
The electorate went to the polls in September 1933 determined, 
not to reward the exponents of austerity and retrenchment, but to 
insist that the Government in future mobilize national resources on 
behalf of the more vulnerable sector of white society. It was funda­
mentally a populist protest designed to remind the State that its 
primary consideration lay not with the protection of profit, but with 
the promotion of institutional safeguards that would insure against a 
repetition of the recent experience.
In the event, the Reform Party won 16 seats, the Rhodesian 
Party 9, and Labour 5.29 It would appear that the people, as in 1922, 
had triumphed over trusts and monopolies. However, the Reform 
Party like many Rhodesian opposition groups, was a motley collection 
of disillusioned Government supporters such as Huggins, Jobling and 
Gilchrist, radical ideologues such as Wilson and Hadfield, or inveterate 
and committed anti-Charter campaigners such as Sir Hugh Williams 
who had mobilized his private fortune to contest the B.S.A. Company’s 
rights and refused to pay royalties to the Company on his mine. 
Huggins himself was an empiricist. Despite his association with Wilson’s 
philosophy it was soon apparent that ideology would have to be dis­
carded in favour of current reality. When I came into office I started 
looking at the economic facts and soon realized that [segregation 
was impossible,’ he later confessed.30 Office provided Huggins with a 
closer realization of the strength of vested interest and despite the 
attachment of important representative institutions to his party, Hugg­
ins was unable or indeed unwilling to move against vested interest at 
the speed that his party’s militants would have liked.
Speaking during the election campaign, Huggins had indicated 
that there were five members of his party standing for the Assembly 
who would not be prepared to ‘go over the top’ with him on any point 
in the party programme.31 The five referred to were undoubtedly
29 Willson, Parliamentary Elections, 130.
30 M. Rifkind, ‘The Politics of Land in Rhodesia’ (Univ. of Edinburgh, un- 
publ. M.Sc. thesis, 1968), 43.
31 Rh. Her., 1 Sept. 1933.
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Wilson, Williams, R.B. Dickson, Colonel T. Nangle and Captain R.E. 
Downes. The irony was that the party’s left wing were only too happy 
to follow their leader ‘over the top’ in the fulfilment of Reform’s 
programme and populist principles. What they objected to was Hugg­
ins’s failure to adhere to that programme and his association with inter­
ests that had just been decisively defeated at the polls. Several areas of 
conflict emerged.
At the outset of the 1934 session, Wilson proposed that the 
Government actively pursue the attainment of Dominion Status, a 
motion that was well received in the Assembly but which Huggins 
knew to be impracticable at the time.32 Although he did go to London 
to discuss the removal of certain of the reserved clauses of the 1923 
Constitution, backbenchers felt him to be insufficiently zealous in this 
regard and Huggins himself had indicated during the debate that he 
preferred complete internal self-government to Dominion Status. 
They were also alarmed at certain provisions of the proposed Work 
Colonies Bill which was designed to tackle problems connected with 
unemployment.33 When the Cabinet attempted to renegotiate the 
Customs Agreement with South Africa and reached an accord with the 
Chartered Company on the railways, the more vociferous backbenchers 
claimed that they had not even been consulted. Then on the death of 
the Minister of Agriculture, C.S. Jobling, Huggins tactlessly appointed 
his successor from outside the Assembly despite the fact that several 
of his supporters in the Assembly were interested in the job.34
The details, however, should not be allowed to obscure the main 
point at issue. The left wing o f the Reform Party believed that it held 
a mandate from the people to initiate a popular programme as advo­
cated by the Reform Party at the election. They felt that Huggins was 
soft-pedalling the important issues, deferring to vested interest and 
using the cabinet as a closed club in much the same way as the previous 
administration had done. The issue at stake was whether the Govern­
ment should be an administrative expression o f the party or whether, 
on the other hand, the party was the electoral arm of an executive 
that alone was responsible for making the important decisions of the 
day.
32 Debates, 14,18 Apr. 1934, 259.
33 The Work Colonies Bill was drafted under the previous administration and 
its alleged draconian provisions were the subject of considerable controversy. The 
MU was initially adopted by Huggins’s Government but in April 1934 the Minister 
of Internal Affairs announced that it would not be proceeded with; ibid., 23 Apr. 
1934, 428.
34 Max Danziger, Reform’s spokesman on agricultural matters, considered 
himself to be suited for the portfolio.
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With an assurance of support from his former colleagues in the 
Rhodesian Party, now led by Percy Fynn,35 Huggins, who had never 
been defeated in the Assembly, was able to drop his party’s dissidents 
and create a new United Party that was to be at the service of his Gov­
ernment and whose candidates for Parliament he would personally 
select; in this way he would be able to direct affairs very much along 
the lines that the Colony had experienced from 1923 to 1933. The 
support of representative institutions that were still attached to the 
Rhodesian Party, such as the Rhodesia Agricultural Union and Rhod­
esia Chamber of Mines was, of course, an added attraction.
It would be wrong to state simply that the new United Party was 
the old Rhodesian Party in disguise. It contained men such as W.S. 
Senior, Fletcher and Smit, none of whom were inclined to readily 
jettison important tenets of populist thinking. The ‘Conservatives’ of 
Huggins’s cabinet differed discemibly from the old fashioned ‘Tories’ 
of Moffat’s, and all were pledged to the ‘reform of proved abuses’. 
Although Fynn joined the new cabinet and acted for Huggins in the 
Prime Minister’s absence in Britain, Moffat, Leggate and others refused 
to have anything to do with the United Party preferring instead to 
remain in the political wilderness. However, empiricism and not 
ideology became the United Party’s guideline and although the Govern­
ment took an increasing share in the private sector during the 1930s 
and 1940s, this was more the result of a carefully developed con­
sensus, if not necessity, rather than of any adherence to a binding 
belief.
The November 1934 election campaign proved to be predictably 
bitter. The rump of the Reform Party led by Sir Hugh Williams (who 
alone of the dissidents was to retain his seat) seemed glad to have shed 
the restrictive responsibilities of power. Free now to voice views closer 
to those of the Labour Party, which nevertheless consistently spumed 
them, the Reformers became increasingly virulent. Sir Hugh Williams 
suggested that the Chartered Company be ‘hounded out of the country 
neck and crop’, with or without compensation.35 6
Wilson, describing economic manipulation of the small man, 
pointed out that the railways ‘grind out’ over a million pounds in tri­
bute every year to a financial concern abroad. ‘We have tried to buy the 
right to mine our minerals for £2 million and Southern Rhodesia is 
still paying interest,’ he said. Southern Rhodesia could not keep the 
gold she mined to stabilize her non-existent currency. Chrome and 
asbestos mining were controlled from abroad, he observed, and Native 
Policy was subject to control from abroad. ‘Our very land had to be 
bought by us, the inhabitants, from a company abroad.’ Huggins had 
now returned to the Rhodesian Party, Wilson reminded his listeners,
35 See a statement by A.R. Welsh, Chairman of the Rhodesian Party, Rh. Her.. 
19 Sept. 1934.
36 Rh. Her., 3 Oct. 1934.
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‘the timid and fear and finance-riddled party that lost the battle of 
the mineral rights in 1933; gave the battle away rather than see it 
fought out to the possible detriment of the international financiers... 
Today, [however] the Reform Party, pruned of its feebler members 
stands more determined than ever that Rhodesia’s salvation lies in 
herself.’37
The 1934 general election saw the extinction of radical populism 
in Southern Rhodesia.38 39 The electorate voted for political stability 
and gave Huggins the mandate that he had requested; if they had want­
ed a left-wing government they could have voted Labour. Wilson, who 
had been assisting the Reform Party through the medium of the journal, 
New Rhodesia, came bottom of the poll in his Salisbury Central con­
stituency. The next ten years were to be something of a vacuum in 
Wilson’s political career; and he devoted himself to journalism. He was 
largely responsible for the establishment of the Sunday Mail in 1935 
which he managed until, ironically, the Argus Group bought it out; 
New Rhodesia, however, remained independent and Wilson contributed 
the famous ‘Sui Juris’ column as well as editing the magazine for many 
years.
The search for rationalization amongst the opposition groupings 
(which included the revived Rhodesian Party under Moffat and Legg- 
ate) was the main feature of the period 1934-9. Speaking at the Reform 
Party’s 1935 congress, Sir Hugh Williams pointed out that Labour 
leaders were insistent that Reform sink their identity and merge with 
the Labour Party. C. Olley, a populist spokesman in the municipal 
sphere, secured adoption of a resolution restraining the party execu­
tive from any further negotiation with Labour. Reform should be seen 
as ‘paddling their own canoe’, he argued.38 The party, after 1935, 
then proceeded to paddle its way into political oblivion.
The same period also saw the emergence of a Union Party seeking 
incorporation for Southern Rhodesia as a fifth province of the Union 
of South Africa. Supported largely by Afrikaners in the Eastern and 
Charter districts who had been affected particularly badly by the Depre­
ssion, the party contested the 1939 general election with two candi­
dates neither of whom were successful. The party can be safely re­
garded as representing the protest vote of the politically and econom­
ically dispossessed. It offered Union as an escape from African en­
croachment on the franchise and in the economy, and provided a
37 Sew Rhodesia, 26 Oct. 1934.
38 The United Party won 26 seats, Labour 5, and Reform 1; see Willson, 
Parliamentary Elections, 138.
39 Rh. Her., 1 July 1935.
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spiritual home for those Afrikaners who had never really accepted a 
system which denied them full cultural expression. Although Afri­
kaners were to form their own political parties again in the years 
ahead and take an active part in the leadership of others, they never 
again after 1939 openly sought Union as a solution to their frustra­
tions, preferring instead to lend their electoral weight to populist 
groupings.
The 1939 election represented almost a straight fight between 
Labour and the United Party. Labour’s platform of humanitarian cap­
italism, as they described it, signified an important shift in emphasis 
away from angry and frustrated demands for fundamental rights and 
conditions which had characterized the party in the 1920s, towards a 
more mature and balanced plan for national development and State 
responsibility for the welfare of its citizens.40 412It was this platform in 
1939 that won them their maximum vote potential and which brought 
the Labour Party to the zenith of its political career.41
The ideological cleavage that developed within the party after 
1939 and socio-economic adjustment which resulted from increased 
prosperity combined to reduce the fortunes of a party that was never 
intended to represent the real labouring class. Subsequent Government 
legislation cut the ground from under Labour and the populist parties. 
The removal of monopolies, introduction of organized marketing con­
trols, and the enactment of Industrial Conciliation legislation had 
already gone some way to removing the gulf between left and right 
that had characterized earlier Rhodesian politics. By 1945 the Govern­
ment had taken over the Cold Storage Commission, the Electricity 
Supply Commission, cotton ginning, the air services, the steelworks and 
the Triangle Sugar Estates, and two years later was to purchase Rhod­
esia Railways.
In reaction to the implications of increased government partici­
pation in the private sector, the Liberal Party emerged in 1944 to 
challenge Huggins’s direction of events. Although Olley, now Mayor of 
Salisbury, was responsible for the initial moves, the party emerged as 
the instrument of Raymond Stockil, a Victoria farmer, in alliance with 
a group of Salisbury lawyers, the most prominent of whom was A.R.W. 
Stumbles. After some initial overtures to Humphrey Gibbs and George 
Davenport, the party reluctantly settled on J.H. Smitas leader.4 2 Smit 
had resigned from Huggins’s wartime cabinet in 1942 because he felt 
that the Prime Minister was partial to the influence of the Coalition’s 
Labour members and because he believed that Southern Rhodesia’s
40 New Rhodesia, 31 Mar. 1939, editorial.
41 At the General Election of April 1939, the United Party won 23 seats and 
Labour won 7; see Willson, Parliamentary Elections, 147.
42 Interview with Sir Raymond Stockil, 10 May 1974.
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contribution to the war effort should have been financed through loans 
and not through increased taxation and burdens on industry. A staunch 
believer in financial orthodoxy and a free market economy, Smit was 
in many ways a suitable choice to lead a party that opposed the current 
level o f state participation in the private sector.
It might well be asked at this stage what factors connect Smit and 
the Liberal Party to the pre-war popular parties. Before the war rad­
icals had urged increased government involvement in the economy to 
protect certain classes of society. Now their successors in opposition 
sought to call a halt to that involvement The War had brought several 
significant changes; economically, Government was most anxious to 
involve the African in better agricultural production levels both for the 
domestic and Empire markets. Politically, Huggins was keen to convince 
the Dominions and Colonial Offices that Southern Rhodesia’s Native 
Policy was not as divergent from Northern Rhodesia’s as Lord Hailey’s 
Report had suggested.4 3 Amalgamation was still a Government prior­
ity and Huggins looked forward to reopening the issue at the end of 
the War. The gradual drift away from the Twin Pyramid’ policy which, 
despite ministerial lip-service and the Native Councils Act of 1937, had 
never been seriously implemented, alarmed those elements who in 1933 
might well have voted for the Reform Party. Their attachment to free 
enterprise then, was more closely associated with objections to what 
was seen as Huggins-type ‘socialism’ and the development of large 
black labour pools in urban areas as a result of wartime industrial dev­
elopment, than with Gladstonian economic principles.
Arthur Allison, the former Secretary to the Reform Party, agreed 
to serve the Liberal Party thus providing one of several links with the 
pre-war era. Wilson was invited by the Liberal leaders to draw up a 
suitable native policy and he naturally obliged. However, the result re­
flected the ideological commitment of populists in the 1930s, not the 
pragmatic and more flexible approach necessitated by post-War circum­
stances and Wilson’s brief relationship with the Liberal Party was soon 
terminated.43 4 He was now to concentrate on adapting his philosophy 
to a rapidly changing society at home and abroad.
The Liberals came remarkably close to winning the 1946 General 
Election45 and Huggins ruled for two years by the grace of Labour’s
43 Colonial Office Library, London, ‘Note on the Bearing of Native Policy on 
the Proposed Amalgamation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland’ (London, H.M.S.O., 
for confidential use, 1941).
44 Interview with Sir Raymond Stockil.
45 The United Party won 14 seats, the Liberal Party 11, the Labour Party 3, 
and the Southern Rhodesia Labour Party 2. Willson, Parliamentary Elections, 156, 
omits to mention that at Lomagundi, G. Hackwill of the United Party successfully 
appealed against the result and dislodged P. Wise of the Liberal Party. However, 
Wise recaptured the seat in a subsequent by-election.
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support. The Liberal Party operated on what amounted to a populist 
platform; it urged that Members of Parliament be subject to recall by 
their constituents, thus subordinating the executive and caucus to the 
extra-parliamentary party as Reform had aspired to do; it also intro­
duced a motion urging the Government to actively pursue Dominion 
Status and it advocated the official readoption of the ‘Twin Pyramid’ 
policy. However, one particular issue came to dominate the 1947-8 
session.
In 1944 a Central African Council had been set up to co-ordinate 
certain common services in the three Central African territories. An 
agency of the three territorial governments and not therefore respon­
sible to the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly, the Central 
African Council was regarded by the Liberal Party as the first step 
towards Amalgamation. Because Amalgamation or Federation would 
bring the Colonial Office and its dreaded native policy one step nearer 
to Salisbury, the whole idea of closer association was anathema to the 
Liberal Party unless protection in the form of Dominion Status could 
be first obtained. Smit refused to accept a seat on the Central African 
Council and the Liberal Party watched its activities with suspicion and 
outright hostility. Huggins had indeed accepted the creation of the 
Council as a prelude to a more binding arrangement46 47*and Opposition 
fears on this score were to prove justified in 1953. Just as Wilson’s 
1934 motion on Dominion Status had produced little tangible result, 
so a similar motion in 1948 by A.R.W. Stumbles led to the appoint­
ment of a Select Committee whose recommendations were quietly 
shelved.4 7
At the 1948 General Election the Liberal Party’s representation 
in the Assembly was more than halved.46 Huggins had carefully ex­
ploited the electorate’s traditional fear of Afrikaner nationalism by 
pointing to Malan’s victory in the Union elections and the Liberal 
Party’s Afrikaner support in districts such as Charter, Eastern, Gatooma 
and Selukwe. It was therefore an emasculated opposition that remain­
ed to contest any closer association with the North.
Between 1948 and 1953 a series of conferences at the Victoria 
Falls and in London laid the groundwork for the federation of the
4 6 P.R.O., D.O. 35/R208/1161 (Dominions, Original Correspondence 1926- 
46), ‘Summary of the History of Closer Association’, minute, January 1946.
47 Southern Rhodesia, ‘Final Report of the Select Committee on Amendment 
of the Constitution’, in Votes and Proceedings o f the Legislative Assembly, Fourth 
. Session, Seventh Parliament, 10th April ... to 27th November 1951 (Salisbury, 
j Govt Printer, 1952), 12 Apr., 17-33.
I 46 The United Party won 24 seats, the Liberal Party 5, and the Rhodesia Lab­our Party 1, Willson, Parliamentary Elections J63.
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Rhodesias and Nyasaland.49 The inherent danger of the scheme con­
firmed the opposition’s resistance; for it brought Southern Rhodesia 
into closer association with the northern territories without conferr­
ing on her or the Federal Government a final say in the direction of 
domestic affairs, and it specifically permitted the United Kingdom a 
degree of influence that she would undoubtedly exercise on behalf of 
the African population.
Stockil now assumed leadership of the opposition Rhodesia Party 
(the name taken by the rump of the Liberal Party) and joined with a 
renegade United Party backbencher, J.R. Dendy-Young, to form the 
Rhodesia Association in order to oppose Huggins’s United Central 
Africa Association and its propagation of the Federal Scheme at the 
1953 referendum. While the United Central Africa Association com­
prised basically the Southern Rhodesia United Party in alliance with a 
few prominent Northern Rhodesians, such as Roy Welensky and Guy 
van Eeden, the Rhodesia Association comprised the Rhodesia Party 
and a few notable United Party and Labour supporters such as Dendy- 
Young, Colonel E. Lucas Guest, J. Keller and H. Davies.
Olley and other populist veterans were understandably inclined to 
support the Rhodesia Association. Olley described Federation as ‘a 
capitalist racket’ and said that Southern Rhodesia was being asked to 
save the Copperbelt and the magnates who had donated £27 000 to 
the United Central Africa Association. ‘These vested interests — the 
B.S.A. Company and other mining interests — are not spending this 
money for nothing,’ Olley observed, and went on to claim that Feder­
ation laid the foundation for the mongrelization of Rhodesian child­
ren.49 50 Veteran Labour leader, Jack Keller, declared that the Colonial 
Office was training Africans to take over white jobs — but not at white 
rates of pay. If Africans were given social equality in the Federal Parlia­
ment, Keller claimed, it would mean that social barriers would have to 
go in hotels, cinemas, hospitals and schools.51
One notable dissentient from the Rhodesia Association campaign 
was N.H. Wilson. Although a keen advocate of Dominion Status in the 
past, he now refused to identify himself with the ‘Little Rhodesia’ 
mentality of other populists. Always a visionary and believer in bold 
experiments, the concept of Federation appealed to him immensely. 
In 1949 he had founded with Colonel David Stirling the Capricorn 
Africa Society which he had hoped would become the agency of a 
Central and East African Dominion where a communal electoral roll
49 See Great Britain, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland: 
The Federal Scheme [Cmd. 8754](H.C. 1952-3, xxiii, 467).
50 Rh. Her., 26 Mar. 1953.
51 Ibid., 31 Mar. 1953.
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would maintain racial differentiation but where massive Western invest­
ment and white immigration would create a genuine partnership for 
progress. He saw Federation in Central Africa as the first link in this 
chain, and like most others in the United Central Africa Association, 
saw in closer association an extension northward of Southern Rhod­
esia’s Svay of life’ rather than any subordination to the Colonial 
Office. The preservation of ‘Western civilization’' in Central Africa 
‘would furnish the strongest reasons for supporting the proposals’, 
he stated at a United Central Africa Association m eeting.5 2 Wilson 
considered Federation to be ‘the greatest step towards full self- 
government since Responsible Government’.52 3 He was therefore quite 
consistent in terms of political or ideological outlook. He had always 
believed that only a large white population would oblige the African to 
realize the permanence of European settlement in Central Africa. 
Federation provided an opportunity to attract settlement on the sort of 
scale that he had long envisaged; consequently his Twin Pyramid’ 
policy was adapted to suit the new circumstances of Central Africa 
that also determined an increasingly meritocratic society.
In October 1950 Wilson explained in New Rhodesia that his 
initial ‘Twin Pyramid’ plan did specifically aim at making the European 
‘pyramid’ one on which the racial interests of the European would be 
paramount.
As it had developed, however, it has been seen that it is only 
necessary to establish it as an area where certain cultural 
standards, or standards of living, should be paramount, and 
that African Natives, provided they obtained these standards, 
could be admitted to the [European] pyramid. This pyramid 
should be called the “European Standards Pyramid’’ to em­
phasise that the controlling factor is a standard of civilization, 
not colour.54
However, Wilson saw no real threat to this ‘pyramid’ because large-scale 
immigration would introduce skilled and unskilled Europeans to occu­
py the lower steps alongside Africans. Thus Wilson’s ‘pyramids* would 
continue to rise from the veld of Central Africa, a monument to empir­
ical consistency. Central Africa, Wilson hoped, would become a great 
Dominion, supporting a population of some 20 million Europeans, 
providing a bulwark against the march of ‘Afrikaner Nazism’ from the 
south and ‘African chaos [and] Asiatic communism from the north’.55
However, within a very short time, Wilson became impatient and 
dissatisfied with the way in which his great ideal was being implement­
52 Ibid., 12 Mar. 1953.
53 Ibid., 8 Apr. 1954.
64 ‘Two Pyramids versus apartheid’, New Rhodesia, 6 Oct. 1950.
55 Ibid., 13 Oct. 1950.
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ed. Although he joined the new Confederate Party in 1953 as an ordin­
ary member, he took little part in their election campaigns o f 1953 and 
1954. The Confederates were too closely identified with the referen­
dum campaign against Federation (the party was led by Dendy-Young) 
to make much progress although their segregationist Native policy must 
have seemed familiar to him. He joined them like many others, not 
because he thought they would win, but ‘to keep the spirit of the popu­
list sector alive’.56 Individual members o f the party launched The 
Citizen as an ‘independent’ tabloid in 1953 and within a short time 
the newspaper had reached an impressive circulation which provided an 
important platform for the Opposition. When the Confederate Party 
failed to win a seat in the Southern Rhodesian General Election and 
managed to return only one member to the Federal Assembly (Dendy- 
Young), Wilson became convinced that the only formula for opposition 
electoral success was the development of a party that transcended the 
loyalties and attitudes that had been associated with the referendum 
campaign. His inspiration, naturally enough, was the Reform Party of 
1930 which had been formed across the divisions of the Responsible 
Government Association-Unionist referendum campaign of 1922.
In this belief, he enjoyed the company of the Confederate Party’s 
English-speaking executive members, many o f them now only too 
conscious of the electoral damage caused by Dendy-Young’s relation­
ship with the dubious Afrikaner Democratic Party whose members sat 
on the executive of the Confederate Party. For the same reason, Stockil 
had refused to associate with the Confederates and had successfully 
fought the 1954 General Election as an ‘Independent Rhodesia Party’ 
candidate. The inevitable split within the Confederate Party provided 
him with the opportunity that he, Wilson, and others had patiently 
awaited. The Rhodesia Party was given new vigour and negotiations 
were initiated with moderate elements within the Confederate Party 
(thus pre-empting a Confederate link-up with Van Eeden, now an Inde­
pendent in the Federal House).5 *7 On 18 February 1956, the formation 
of the Dominion Party was announced in Lusaka, with Winston Field 
as President, Stockil as Southern Rhodesian leader and Wilson as 
National Secretary.
Wilson had launched a Dominion Party in 1948, whose two candi­
dates had lost their deposits at the election of that year; the title he 
borrowed from a Dominion Party that had been envisaged but not
55 Interview with Mr P. Hanson (National Secretary, Confederate Party,
1953-4), 26 July 1973.
57 Rh. Her., 7 Jan. 1956.
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actually inaugurated as early as 1926. When John Gaunt resigned from 
the Confederate Party in 1954, he subsequently announced the for­
mation of a Rhodesia Dominion Party.58 Wilson now insisted that at 
least some of the new party’s principles should reflect the aims of his 
Dominion Party of 1948. These were, in essence, the protection of the 
unskilled European and the development of the African in his own 
areas, that is ‘Twin Pyramid’.59 Although the phraseology might differ, 
Wilson’s influence is apparent in the Dominion Party’s first policy 
statement. The European was promised a permanent place in Central 
Africa and the party stressed ‘the necessity for European control and 
political leadership for the forseeable future’, but recognized that this 
leadership depended upon ‘the general acceptance and implementation 
of a just and practical native policy based on principles of equality and 
common justice’. The Dominion Party promised that when it became 
the Government of the Federation ‘the State would secure for all 
reasonable housing, health, education, employment, Old Age Pensions 
and social services’.60 Clearly, post-war prosperity had not entirely 
erased populist sentiment. Within a short time the party was able to 
build up a network of differentiated local groups in the hope that the 
extra-parliamentary party would always control the professional polit­
ical wing. In this respect the system closely resembled the Liberal Par­
ty ’s recall plan, and the Reform Party’s insistence on executive respon­
sibility to congress.61
58 Gaunt’s Rhodesia Dominion Party was a predominantly Northern Rhod­
esian grouping but it enjoyed a following in Bulawayo as a result of the adherence 
of I. McLean, another prominent ex-Confederate. The party, which advocated a 
separate voters roll for Africans, made it clear from the outset that it would be 
happy to fuse with any emergent party of similar views. Similarly, another North­
ern Rhodesian party, the United Dominion Party, which advocated a separate 
voters roll and increased parliamentary representation for Northern Rhodesia, was 
searching for a political home. Stockil’s announcement at the beginning of Decem­
ber 1955 that the Rhodesia Party would become more active and advocate ‘the 
economic and material advancement of the African rather than the artificially rapid 
political and academic advancement of the native people’, prompted Gaunt’s group 
to make contact with a view to fusion. The Labour leader, Keller, said he would 
also be prepared to lend his support to any party run by men of repute (as distinct 
from the Confederates) which included ‘those main principles for which Labour in 
this country has always stood’. He added that he was no longer particularly concern­
ed about nationalization of industry. However, both Keller and Gaunt resigned 
from the Dominion Party shortly after its inception; see Rh. Her., 10 and 16 Oct., 
2 and 7 Dec. 1955.
59 Interview with Mr S.E. Aitken-Cade, 6 June 1974.
60 The Sunday News, 19 Feb. 1956.
61 The Rhodesian Front was to successfully entrench this tenet of populist 
thinking by amending their party constitution in 1963 thereby subordinating the 
party executive to  congress rather than government; see Rhodesian Front, Consti­
tution (May 1962) with amendments, and D.J. Murray, The Governmental System 
in Southern Rhodesia (Oxford, Clar eidon Press, 1970), 367.
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Wilson was now quite convinced that the events of 1930-3 were 
about to repeat themselves. Both the Responsible Government Assoc­
iation and the United Central Africa Association had conducted success­
ful referendum campaigns subsequent to which their protagonists had 
formed governments and won sweeping electoral victories (Todd’s 
United Rhodesia Party secured 26 seats in 1954, just as Coghlan had in 
1924). Then, opposition parties had developed that transcended politic­
al divisions created by the referendum campaigns. Just as the Reform 
Party swept to power in 1933 so, Wilson was convinced, the Dominion 
Party would in 1958.62 He reckoned without Todd’s Electoral Amend­
ment Act of 1957 which introduced a preferential voting system.63 
Wilson attempted to counter this by persuading Stockil to appeal to 
the Governor for a suspension of the Constitution — his only exped­
ient as the Electoral Act was entrenched legislation.64 The Governor’s 
rejection of Stockil’s appeal enabled Sir Edgar Whitehead, the new 
Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, to argue that the Dominion Party 
was seeking refuge in British authority and thereby undermining South­
ern Rhodesian self-government. In the event, Wilson’s fears were borne 
out. The Dominion Party won a majority of the electorate’s first pref­
erence votes in the territorial General Election of June 1958. The 
party’s candidates came top of the poll in 17 of the Colony’s constit­
uencies while the United Federal Party headed the poll in only 13. 
However, when the second preference votes were distributed the 
position was reversed, the Dominion Party being left with only 13 
seats in the Assembly.65 Dominion Party supporters had opted for 
the United Federal Party in second preference to Todd’s breakaway 
United Rhodesia Party while Todd supporters had declared for the 
United Federal Party in second preference to the Dominion Party. As 
intended, the party in the centre benefited from the preference system. 
Wilson urged Stockil to appeal against the result but Stockil was anx­
ious to forsake the political scene for economic development in the 
lowveld. S. Aitken-Cade and then W. Harper succeeded him as Leader 
of the Opposition.
When the Dominion Party suffered an even more serious setback 
at the Federal elections of November 1958, Wilson like many others 
saw little prospect of making the Federation politically viable or of 
changing its direction. The defeat of his Central African Alliance plan 
at the election which proposed to declare Southern Rhodesia, the 
Copperbelt and the Kafue farmlands an independent Dominion, and
62 Mew Rhodesia, 5 Feb. 1954.
63 Electoral Amendment Acts, 38 of 1957, and 13 of 1958.
64 Interview with Sir Raymond Stockil.
65 Willson, Parliamentary Elections, 180.
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the now inevitable constitutional advance of Africans in the northern 
territories, turned Wilson into a Little Rhodesian. Although he did not 
live long enough to see Harper’s ‘Southern Rhodesia First’ campaign 
produce a split with Field, all the ingredients were there after 1958, 
and his formation in 1960 of the Southern Rhodesia Association with 
Mrs Dicks, territorial Secretary of the Dominion Party, was a recog­
nition of this development The Southern Rhodesia Association sought 
to construct a non-partisan front of opinion to resist further inroads 
that might jeopardize Southern Rhodesia’s ‘way of life’ such as the 
Monckton Commission of Inquiry into the future of Federation. In 
many ways the Association characterized his life’s work — an attempt 
to cultivate and mobilize opinion on the basis of a platform that was at 
once broad-based, ‘popular’ and coherent.
Wilson’s involvement, then, in Southern Rhodesian politics span­
ned the years from the grant of Responsible Government to the visit of 
the Monckton Commission that sealed the fate of Federation. How can 
this contribution be viewed in the context of populist politics?
Any analysis of the dynamics of populism must give serious con­
sideration to the structural relationship of any given political party 
with various individuals, representative institutions or economic associa­
tions. For instance, the smallworkers’ Rhodesian Mining Federation 
played a substantial role in winning electoral support for the Reform 
Party in 1933. As Murray indicates, the Rhodesian Mining Federation 
virtually was the Reform Party in the Midlands,®6 and its President, 
W.S. Senior, became Minister of Mines in Huggins’s administration.
Likewise, the Reform Party enjoyed the support of Midlands and 
Matabeleland cattle farmers, and o f disgruntled maize growers, also 
mainly in the Midlands, who opposed the new controls system. Hugg­
ins’s first Minister of Agriculture was C.S. Jobling who had been Presi­
dent of the Matabeleland Farmers Union. When Huggins contemplated 
fusion with the Opposition under Fynn, he was attracted, not only by 
the prospect of ridding himself of backbench dissidents, but by the 
substantial array of representative bodies with which the Rhodesian 
Party was associated. An alliance with the Opposition would bring into 
the Government fold the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines (including as it 
did Sir Edmund Davis’s substantial interests and the British South Afri­
ca Company), the Rhodesia Agricultural Union, the Rhodesia Tobacco 
Association and the Eastern Farmers Association. When Senior follow­
ed Huggins into the United Party, the Rhodesia Mining Federation was 6
66 Murray, The Governmental System, 133.
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bitterly split on which party to support, for the rump Reform leader, 
Sir Hugh Williams, was also a prominent smallworker, and a substantial 
section of the Federation withdrew its support from the Minister’s 
attempts to associate smallworkers with Government’s plans for the 
industry; instead it remained loyal to Reform or backed the Labour 
Party.
Again, when the Liberals came close to winning the General Elect­
ion of 1946, it was with the support of smallworkers.67 The Chairman 
of the Smallworkers and Tributors Association, G. Munro, won Gat- 
ooma for the Liberal Party and another prominent smallworker, P. 
Wise, won Hartley in a 1947 by-election.67 8 However, it must be noted 
that by 1946 the number of smallworkers in the country had declined 
sharply from a record figure of 3 000 in 1936 when the Depression had 
obliged many farmers to seek a livelihood prospecting.6 9 As a result, 
post-war populist parties such as the Liberals were not so dependent 
on smallworkers’ support as the Progressive or Reform Parties had been.
On the other hand, small farmers consistently constituted a major 
sector of the populist alliance, and their representation was of ideo­
logical as well as material importance. The trust bestowed by the Rhod­
esian electorate on men o f  the land was to some extent attributable to 
the populist belief that the farmer tilled his land in a spirit of altruism 
that removed him from the sordid manipulations of Capital. He alone 
was the repository of the colonial ideal of land settlement and unsel­
fish endeavour. His dependence for credit on interest-charging foreign- 
owned banks was hardly calculated to endear him to the finance- 
capital sector. The big landowners who administered their property for 
profit were identified as part of the Rhodesian Establishment with its 
roots abroad.
The small commercial sector was also a bulwark o f the populist 
cause, from the protagonists o f Responsible Government in the early 
1920s to the economic nationalists of the 1960s. All this does not 
suggest that the various sectors of the populist alliance were without 
individual or conflicting aims. There are several examples o f intra­
populist dissension, of which the issue of marketing controls is perhaps 
the most important. However, all felt themselves to be the victims of 
exploitation by the capitalist sector and its client government which 
understood very little and cared even less about the predicament of the 
small man. It was the common identity o f victimization by the same 
network o f Govemment-Company-Establishment that bred collective 
action, although such action had to be channelled and directed.
67 ibid., 141.
68 Willson, Parliamentary Elections, 156,162. 
68 Murray, The Governmental System , 149.
H.L WETHERELL 75
Murray has clinically dissected the governmental system into neat­
ly competitive or complementary compartments. By so doing he has 
tended to overlook forces that relate many of his seemingly disparate 
elements, one to the other. Huggins could never have presented such an 
attractive platform in 1933 had Wilson not laid the political ground, 
cultivated public opinion by a torrent of propaganda and newspaper 
comment, and successfully devised a formula that sought to deal effect­
ively with the Native Question. Elections were won, not so much by an 
alliance between representative associations and Government as by an 
alliance of like-minded groups who manifested themselves very often in 
the sort of associations that Murray analyses. However, it is doubtful 
whether these associations would have been forces in their own right 
had they not comprised groupings who were related to each other more 
firmly across the divisions of Murray’s system.
The emphasis placed upon associations operating on their own 
individual and mercenary axis precludes effective analysis o f the ideo­
logical dynamics that motivated the formation o f both political parties 
and economic associations. Olley’s Amalgamated Commercial Employ­
ees Association admittedly sought to secure a shop hours ordinance 
and his Ratepayers Association was again ostensibly a body o f limited 
objectives. However, Olley’s populist sentiments dictated that the 
bodies with which he was associated became part o f a broader front 
against monopolies in general and the Chartered Company in particular. 
Even the White Rhodesia Council that Olley founded to oppose amend­
ments in the Land Apportionment Act focused its attention on capital­
ist interests in the Federation that were supposedly behind the ‘partner­
ship’ ideal. Thus when Murray discusses the formation and impact of 
representative institutions and economic associations without seriously 
considering ideological motivation, he begs the fundamental question of 
Rhodesian politics.
Had Wilson not articulated the frustrations of disparate populist 
factions, it is doubtful whether Rhodesian opposition politics would 
have taken the form that it did. Wilson, and to a lesser extent Olley in 
the Rhodesian Monthly Review, provided a coherent doctrine and 
rationale to which individuals with ordinary grievances could turn for 
inspiration. Thus Huggins in 1933 was able to exploit a carefully con­
structed repository of political thought that might otherwise have re­
mained the inarticulate and untapped preserve of disgruntled farmers 
or shopkeepers. Wilson’s unification of the Progressive and Country 
Parties in 1929 was as much an essential ideological operation as an 
electoral expedient He provided the philosophical dynamics that 
generated directly a series of political parties, and indirectly, the for- 
| mation of economic associations.
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The Southern Rhodesian populist sector underwent a post-war 
transition. Once a body of protective legislation had been accumulated 
on the statute book, the populist parties lost much of their initial co­
hesion and ceased to be radical in terms of dynamics. Instead they 
sought to preserve their existing wall of protective measures from the 
incursions of post-war governmental and economic expediency. They 
opposed every potential inroad; from the Land Apportionment Amend­
ment Acts and the Liquor Licensing Amendment Act to the appoint­
ment of the Monckton Commission and the 1961 Constitution. In this 
respect they became reactionary; thus the label, ‘right-wing, middle- 
class radicalism’, applies generally to the Southern Rhodesian scene in 
the 1930s when a substantial sector of the middle class was radicalized 
by economic privation, but it does not apply to the 1950s; U.D.I., 
whilst admittedly a radical gesture, should be seen in the context of 
general reaction. ‘We are right-wing Conservatives,’7 0 Ian Smith has 
said, and the intention is undoubtedly to conserve a system of safe­
guards that the radicals of the 1930s fought so hard to establish.
Because attitudes towards the African have now become the gauge 
by which political labels are defined, the inheritors of the pre-war 
populist or ‘left-wing’ legacy are now self-defined as ‘right-wing’. This 
should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the artisan of the 1950s 
was as equally anxious to prevent exploitation of cheap labour and job 
division as his pre-war counterpart. The Depression initiated a period of 
insecurity that post-war prosperity did little to diminish; the Reform 
Party’s geo-political power base in 1933 differed little from that of the 
Dominion Party in 1958.
N.H. Wilson’s contribution lay in his ability to identify the various 
populists’ power centres — small farmers, smallworkers, shopkeepers, 
disillusioned politicians — to unite and provide them with a coherent 
and consistent body of political doctrine that articulated their griev­
ances, to emphasize the ideological gulf between this body of opinion 
and Government thinking, and then in the event o f electoral defeat, to 
revive and reestablish as immutable the values and sentiments of the 
populist sector.
Wilson persistently sought an alliance or front that would unite 
on a popular platform all those opposed to the forces of governmental 
expediency. The Southern Rhodesia Association represented an attem­
pt to create such a front in the face of the Monckton Inquiry. Had 
Wilson lived to see another front win the confidence of the electorate 
in 1962, he would undoubtedly have approved the repetition of the 
events of 1933 and the success of the populist factor in Rhodesian 
politics.7!
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